August 28, 2025

By Bill Andrews and Tom Hackney

The BCUC has begun an inquiry into out-of-province RNG by trying to prevent BCSEA from making its own submissions in its own name as an intervener. BCSEA applied in good faith to intervene. However, the proceeding panel, led by CEO Mark Jaccard, ordered BCSEA to only make submissions jointly with four other interveners (environmental organizations) that have a notably different approach than BCSEA. 

BCSEA attempted to file submissions in its own name on August 1. However, the panel rejected the filing and threatened to rescind BCSEA’s intervener status. After a response from BCSEA, the Panel allowed BCSEA to continue as an intervener, with a warning that the BCUC may revoke BCSEA’s intervener status if it “fails to comply with any further orders or instructions from this Panel.” 

Ironically, on August 27 (yesterday) the BCUC did post BCSEA’s August 1 submission, this time together with submissions from four environmental interveners under the Commission-imposed name “Group 2.” As anticipated, BCSEA focused on the stated questions in the inquiry, while the other four interveners voiced opposition to out-of-province RNG. 

We are unable to explain what benefit the panel sought to achieve by trying to force BCSEA to say the same things as other interveners. Does the panel think that every intervener that cares about climate change should say the same thing? Is the panel really unaware that BCSEA takes a different approach than the other four interveners (despite the clear statements in the five requests to intervene)? Does the panel think that BCSEA should drop its approach and echo the other four interveners? Does the panel think the other four interveners should adopt BCSEA’s approach? 

In any event, BCSEA will not curtail other interveners’ submissions to the Panel, and BCSEA will not have its submissions to the Panel limited by other interveners. And, BCSEA is happy to coordinate with any and all the other interveners (not just environmental groups) to maximize efficiency and avoid duplication. Still, the panel has persisted in trying to suppress BCSEA’s unique voice. It remains to be seen if the panel will approve a participant cost award for BCSEA in the proceeding. To state the obvious, BCSEA relies on cost awards to participate in BCUC proceedings on a professional level.

BCSEA’s points to the panel

• The Commission’s 2022-2023 definition of RNG is consistent with the Clean Energy Act and the GHG Reduction (Clean Energy) Regulation.
• The Commission had already determined that “RNG” in the GGRR includes RNG from a Canadian province outside of BC (in 2020) and from outside of Canada (in 2021).
• Changing the Commission’s definition of RNG would not change the “legal fact” that RNG in the GGRR includes out-of-province GGRR.
• The BCUC is prohibited by section 18(3) of the Clean Energy Act from deciding to eliminate out-of-province RNG for any reason, including to respond to fears of potential double-counting of BC GHG reductions.
• The Commission’s definition of RNG (resulting from a year-and-a-half-long inquiry in which BCSEA actively intervened) is awkward but doesn’t cause practical problems and so amendments to the definition are not required.
• The “existing compliance requirements” to prevent double-counting of the GHG reduction benefits of out-of-province RNG are formed by the terms and conditions of the biomethane purchase contracts (between the BC gas delivery utility and the RNG provider), the terms and conditions of the BCUC’s acceptance of the biomethane purchase contracts under the Utilities Commission Act, the utilities’ reports to the BCUC, and the BCUC’s review of those reports.
• The evidence on the inquiry record does not allege – let alone establish — any actual double-counting of the reductions of GHG emissions associated with the acquisition out-of-province RNG under the GGRR.
• BCSEA would support any legally-available, reasonable, cost-effective measures the BCUC could institute to tighten the existing compliance requirements to better prevent double-counting. The BCUC could take such measures at any time. (The BCUC does not require an inquiry as a prerequisite for strengthening its existing requirements against double-counting.)
• If the Commission wants to make a recommendation to the BC Government arising out of this inquiry (which the Panel mentioned as a possibility), then BCSEA suggests that the Panel consider recommending that the Government resolve the important disconnect in which out-of-province RNG is enabled under the CEA and the GGRR but the BC GHG reduction benefits of out-of-province RNG are not given financial credit under the low-carbon fuel standards framework. Consistency, and, ultimately, public confidence, requires that out-of-province RNG is either included, or excluded, under both the CEA-GGRR framework and the BC low-carbon fuel standards framework. 

Should the BC Government eliminate out-of-province RNG, paid for by gas customers, as a means of reducing BC GHG emissions? Notably, BCSEA’s August 1 submission to the BCUC panel does not express any position on the political merits of the BC Government’s legislation authorizing out-of-province RNG as a tool to reduce BC GHG emissions. Clearly, out-of-province RNG is a political decision for the BC Government, not for the BCUC. But what should the BC Government do, going forward? 

The considerations are complex. On the ‘con’ side, out-of-province RNG is vulnerable to criticism as greenwashing because it is conceptually difficult. On the ‘pro’ side, out-of-province RNG does reduce the carbon-intensity of gas burned by customers of BC gas distribution utilities. On the ‘con’ side, out-of-province RNG is very expensive for BC gas customers compared to fossil gas. On the ‘pro’ side, the high cost of out-of-province RNG sends an appropriate price signal in comparison with low-carbon alternatives such as electricity from BC Hydro. On the ‘con’ side, supplies of out-of-province RNG are likely insufficient to completely replace the amount of fossil gas currently used in BC. On the ‘pro’ side, out-of-province RNG is intended to be only a partial solution, to be used in combination with other ways to reduce BG GHG emissions from the combustion of gas by BC gas customers. 

Putting the complexities another way, while acquiring new out-of-province RNG would not end the use of fossil gas in BC, but it would reduce BC GHG emissions (in proportion to the amount of new RNG) and it would discourage gas use because RNG is so expensive. Eliminating new out-of-province RNG would not reduce BC GHG emissions, and it would encourage gas use because fossil gas is so much cheaper than RNG. 

In any event, BCSEA’s view is that it should remain up to the BC Government to determine the best ways to reduce BC GHG emissions from the combustion of gas delivered by regulated gas utilities. If the Government determines that out-of-province RNG is no longer a desirable GHG reduction measure then the onus will be on the Government to establish other measures.